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Access to higher education is a key determinant of
lifetime earnings in the United States. Since the 1960s,
selective public universities have admitted students mostly
on the basis of standardized test scores and other measures
of academic preparation, on the theory that highly prepared
students can best take advantage of universities’ rigorous
curricula. I employ quasi-experimental and structural
research designs to investigate the efficiency and economic
mobility ramifications of these “meritocratic” admissions
policies. This dissertation presents a collage of evidence
from three educational allocation policies suggesting that the
reallocation of selective higher education to disadvantaged
students with relatively poorer measured academic
preparation can promote both economic mobility and
allocative efficiency, with those students’ net education and
wage gains exceeding their crowded-out peers’ net losses.
These efficiency findings undermine the primary justification
for the 1960s implementation of meritocratic admissions
policies at public institutions.

Essay 1
Affirmative Action, Mismatch, and Economic
Mobility after Prop 209
Educational attainment, income, wealth, and economic
mobility exhibit racial disparities in the United States. Access
to selective universities is a key determinant of economic
success and intergenerational mobility (Chetty et al. 2020a).
As a result, many selective universities provide admissions
advantages to applicants from disadvantaged racial and
ethnic groups. Proponents of affirmative action argue
that it offsets applicant qualification gaps that result from
systemically unequal educational opportunities (Johnson
2019). Detractors argue that affirmative action limits
opportunity for Asian and white applicants and may have
unintended consequences for targeted students. This study
examines three questions at the basis of this disagreement.
First, which students are targeted by affirmative action, and
to what degree does affirmative action impact where those
students go to college? Second, what are the short- and longrun effects of enrolling at a more-selective university because
of affirmative action? Finally, how are the net benefits and
costs of affirmative action distributed across Asian, Black,
Hispanic, and white university applicants?
Prior scholarship has arrived at conflicting conclusions
about the value of enrolling at a more-selective university

2021 Dissertation Summaries

because of access-oriented admissions policies like
affirmative action. On the one hand, several studies have
shown that applicants with test scores and grades at selective
universities’ minimum admissions thresholds are benefited
by admission.1 Studies of affirmative action, however,
have uncovered mixed evidence on student outcomes
(Arcidiacono and Lovenheim 2016), with some finding
support for the so-called mismatch hypothesis: that the
lower-testing applicants targeted by affirmative action would
benefit from enrolling at less-selective universities, where
they better “match” their peers’ academic qualifications.
This study combines longitudinal administrative data
with a difference-in-difference research design to estimate
the impact of affirmative action on students’ college quality,
course performance, choice of major, degree attainment,
and wages over the subsequent 15 years. I construct a
novel database of all 1994–2002 freshman applicants to the
University of California (UC) system, which comprises all
public research universities in the state and individually links
each applicant to nationwide university records and annual
California wages. I then compare the outcomes of Black
and Hispanic UC applicants with those of academically
comparable white and Asian applicants before and after
California’s Proposition 209, which ended affirmative action
at UC in 1998. I also link the applicant data to institutional
value-added statistics to measure Prop 209’s effect on
applicants’ university quality; to California high school
records to examine Prop 209’s effect on UC applicationsending; and to five UC campuses’ student transcripts to
estimate Prop 209’s impact on performance and persistence
in demanding courses. Finally, I employ a regression
discontinuity design to identify the value of being admitted
to a selective public university for the on-the-margin white
and Asian students likely to obtain greater university access
after Prop 209.
I begin by documenting Prop 209’s impact on admissions
at UC’s eight undergraduate campuses. Prop 209 curbed
the large admissions advantages—some over 50 percentage
points—provided by affirmative action to underrepresented
minority (URM) UC applicants.2 As a result, UC’s URM
applicants cascaded into less-selective colleges and
universities: those with a high “UC Academic Index” (AI,
a weighted average of high school grades and test scores)
tended to flow from more-selective UC campuses to lessselective campuses and private universities, while those
with lower s mostly flowed to less-selective public colleges
and universities. Overall, Prop 209 resulted in a net outflow
of lower-income students from highly selective public
universities.
How did less-selective enrollment affect URM UC
applicants? I estimate the average effect of Prop 209 using
a difference-in-difference design over the population of
UC applicants. Each model estimates how URM applicant
outcomes change after 1997 (the last year of affirmative
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action) relative to changes among non-URM applicants, with
the second difference absorbing ethnicity-neutral enrollment
trends in the 1990s.3 High school fixed effects and AI
covariates absorb spurious variation and observable selection
bias into UC application.4 I also estimate effect heterogeneity
by URM AI quartile and by URM ethnicity. Implementing
this model, I show that Prop 209 led URM UC applicants to
enroll at relatively lower-quality colleges and universities
on average, measured both by traditional metrics like
graduation rate and by institutional value-added.5 In contrast
with the predictions of the mismatch hypothesis, URM UC
applicants’ average educational outcomes deteriorated after
Prop 209: Bachelor’s degree attainment declined by 4.3
percentage points among URM applicants in the bottom AI
quartile, and overall STEM and graduate degree attainment
declined by 1.0 and 1.3 percentage points, respectively.
Following these applicants into the labor market, I find that
Prop 209 caused URM UC applicants to earn 5 percent lower
average annual wages between ages 24 and 34, with larger
proportional effects for lower-AI applicants.6 The observed
wage effects are driven by Hispanic applicants; despite
parallel enrollment and degree attainment outcomes, I find
no evidence of average wage deterioration among Black UC
applicants after Prop 209.7
These estimated effects are averaged across every URM
UC applicant, many of whose enrollments were likely
unchanged by the affirmative action ban. This implies that
treatment effects for directly impacted applicants were likely
much larger. Given the magnitude of UC’s applicant pool,
these estimates imply that Prop 209 caused an aggregate
decline in the number of URM Californians in their early
30s with 2014 wages over $100,000 by at least 3 percent.
American Community Survey data confirm a 2010s pattern
of relative wage deterioration among high-earning earlycareer URM Californians.
The primary threat to this baseline research design is the
possibility of sample selection bias arising from differential
selection into UC application after Prop 209.8 Estimating a
difference-in-difference model of the proportion of California
public high school students who applied to UC by ethnicity
and AI bin, I find that UC annually received about 250 fewer
Black and 900 fewer Hispanic applications after Prop 209,
almost 80 percent of whom would likely have been admitted
to at least one UC campus.9 While application deterrence
could generate bias, I find that the baseline estimates
are insensitive to a school-ethnicity-AI control function
(following Card and Rothstein 2007) and other highly
detailed socioeconomic and academic covariates.10
The baseline research design does not separately identify
the impact of Prop 209 on non-URM applicants’ outcomes.
Instead, I exploit a large discontinuity non-URM admissions
at UC Berkeley before Prop 209 to study the return to
selective university access for on-the-margin non-URM
applicants, many of whom may have been admitted if not

2021 Dissertation Summaries

for affirmative action. Employing a regression discontinuity
design, I find that students just below Berkeley’s admissions
threshold nevertheless ended up with similar educational and
labor market outcomes after enrolling at other universities,
though the confidence intervals cannot rule out positive
treatment effects. This suggests that the value of selective
public university access for on-the-margin non-URM
students was small.
Next, I turn to mechanisms explaining URM UC
applicants’ deteriorated educational outcomes after Prop 209.
Several prior studies have suggested that URM students’
STEM course performance and persistence would improve
absent affirmative action, which likely would have led to
the opposite of Prop 209’s effect on STEM attainment.11
However, while URM UC students earned lower grades
and were less likely to persist along introductory STEM
course sequences than their non-URM peers before Prop
209, these gaps are largely explained by students’ prior
academic opportunities and preparation, not their enrollment
institution. Prop 209 has no observable effect on students’
STEM course performance and persistence, which do not
appear to contribute to the effects of Prop 209 on students’
educational and wage outcomes.
I conclude with a discussion of the efficiency of
affirmative action. Two sets of evidence favor its allocative
efficiency, which in this case requires (to a first-order
approximation) that the benefit of more-selective university
enrollment is greater for affirmative action’s URM enrollees
than for the non-URM students who would have enrolled
in their place.12 First, the estimated return to UC Berkeley
and Davis admission for on-the-margin non-URM students
appears small, while URM applicants’ estimated wage
return to more-selective enrollment before Prop 209 is
large.13 Second, the latter return exceeds the average
observed change in institutional value-added experienced by
URM UC applicants, suggesting that the URM applicants
impacted by Prop 209 had received above-average returns
to more-selective university enrollment (as in Dale and
Krueger 2014; Bleemer 2018).14 This evidence suggests that
affirmative action both promotes socioeconomic mobility
among URM youths and improves higher education’s
allocative efficiency.
This study makes three main contributions. First, while
previous studies have analyzed the intermediate effects
of universities’ affirmative action policies—sometimes
coming to conflicting conclusions—they share common
limitations. Several studies have exploited cross-state policy
variation to estimate the educational impact of banning
affirmative action, but out-of-state enrollment confounds
identification of the policies’ effects on impacted students.15
Others estimate models of applicant and university
behavior to predict how affirmative action could impact
student enrollment and outcomes, but do not validate these
predictions using actual policy variation.16 A third set of
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studies have analyzed administrative university data from
before and after Prop 209, but limits on available covariates
and outcomes have challenged attempts to separately identify
the effect of affirmative action from compositional changes
among UC’s applicants and students.17 This study augments
previous research by implementing a quasi-experimental
research design spanning all U.S. universities that identifies
the individual-level effects of affirmative action, and by
analyzing new intermediate outcomes like university “valueadded,” STEM performance and persistence, and graduate
degree completion.
Second, this is the first study to causally link changes
in university quality to wage outcomes in the context of
affirmative action, bridging the affirmative action literature
with a literature identifying heterogeneity in the return to
higher education.18 Much of the affirmative action literature
has focused on whether it leads URM applicants to earn
lower average wages (Sowell 1972; Arcidiacono and
Lovenheim 2016), but my findings are inconsistent with
this mismatch hypothesis.19 On the other hand, while most
studies of heterogeneous university return focus on a local
margin (e.g., Hoekstra 2009; Zimmerman 2014), I estimate
average returns to university quality across subsets of all
URM UC applicants after an affirmative action ban. I also
present regression discontinuity evidence highlighting the
importance of applicants’ counterfactual enrollments and
heterogeneity in estimating the return to selective university
enrollment.
Finally, I provide the first direct evidence that affirmative
action has first-order implications for intergenerational
mobility and socioeconomic gaps by ethnicity. A growing
literature examines the mechanisms explaining opportunity
gaps for lower-income and URM youths and the efficacy
of available policies to narrow those gaps (e.g., Jackson,
Johnson, and Persico 2016; Chetty, Hendren, and Katz
2016). I find little evidence that affirmative action narrowed
the Black-white mobility gap, which has received particular
attention (Dobbie and Fryer Jr. 2011; Billings, Deming,
and Rockoff 2014; Chetty et al. 2020b; Derenoncourt and
Montialoux 2021), but find that it improved Black students’
educational attainment and relatively increased (mostly
lower-income) Hispanic youths’ wages.

Essay 2
Top Percent Policies and the Return to
Postsecondary Selectivity
Since the 1960s, selective public universities in the United
States have admitted students mostly using test scores and
other measures of academic preparation.20 Many universities
provide admissions advantages to certain disadvantaged
applicants in order to rectify unequal K–12 learning

2021 Dissertation Summaries

opportunities and promote socioeconomic mobility, but
these “access-oriented” admissions policies are controversial
on efficiency grounds: students with lower test scores are
generally thought to derive smaller (or no) benefits from
more-elite education when compared to the students admitted
by test-based meritocracy (Arcidiacono and Lovenheim
2016). This study investigates two open questions about the
allocation of public higher education in the United States.
First, would lower-testing students benefit from selective
university enrollment, and how would their return compare
to that received by higher-testing students? Second, can
available policies target lower-testing but high-value-add
students, and how would implementing those policies shape
universities’ socioeconomic composition? I answer these
questions by studying an access-oriented admission policy
implemented by UC between 2001 and 2011. Eligibility in
the Local Context (ELC) was a “top percent” policy that
guaranteed selective university admission to applicants
whose grades ranked in the top four percent of their high
school class.21 I construct a new UC applicant administrative
dataset and use a regression discontinuity design to estimate
ELC’s effect on barely eligible applicants’ likelihood of
admission and enrollment at each UC campus. I then link
each applicant to national education records and annual
California wages and employ an instrumental variable
strategy to estimate the medium-run effects of more-selective
university enrollment for ELC participants. Building on
these reduced-form findings, I next estimate and validate
a structural model of university application, admission,
and enrollment with an embedded top percent policy in
order to simulate the net effects of top percent policies on
universities’ enrollment composition. Finally, I extend both
the quasi-experimental and structural research designs to
investigate the relationship between students’ meritocratic
standing and their return to enrolling at a more-selective
university.
I show that the admissions advantages conferred by
ELC eligibility caused over 12 percent of barely eligible
applicants from less-competitive high schools to enroll at
four selective UC campuses instead of enrolling at lessselective public colleges. Instrumental variable estimates
show that these barely eligible ELC “participants” became
30 percentage points more likely to earn a college degree
within five years—approximately matching the increase
in graduation rates of the institutions they attended—and
earned higher annual wages by as much as $25,000 between
ages 25 and 27. ELC’s roughly 600 annual participants
came from lower-income and more diverse families than
the crowded-out students whom they replaced at UC, and
model simulations show that a top percent policy providing
equivalent admissions advantages to the top 9 percent of
each high school’s graduates would meaningfully increase
those UC campuses’ lower-income and underrepresented
minority (URM) enrollment (by about 4 and 8 percent,
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respectively).22 Complementing reduced-form and
institutional value-added evidence showing that even very
low-testing ELC-eligible applicants receive large and
above-average wage treatment effects from more-selective
enrollment, the essay concludes with evidence that the
model-based prediction of each student’s meritocratic
standing is weakly and negatively correlated with their
estimated return to university selectivity.
I begin below by providing background on the 10-campus
UC system and its 2001 Eligibility in the Local Context
policy. I then describe the novel dataset used in this study,
which includes far greater detail on 2001–2013 freshman
UC applicants’ socioeconomic, geographic, and academic
characteristics than any previously studied records. Each
applicant is linked to the internally calculated “ELC GPA”
used to determine their ELC eligibility as well as National
Student Clearinghouse enrollment and degree records and
annual California Employment Development Department
wage records through 2019.
I next introduce the stacked regression discontinuity
research design that I employ to study the reduced-form
effects of ELC eligibility on applicant behavior and
outcomes. I present evidence to support the design’s
key identification assumption that applicants’ potential
outcomes are smooth across their high schools’ ELC GPA
eligibility thresholds. I then show that ELC eligibility did
not substantially affect admissions decisions at UC’s most
and least selective campuses, the former because they did
not provide admissions advantages to eligible students and
the latter because they were already admitting nearly all
high-GPA applicants. However, the UC campuses at San
Diego, Davis, Irvine, and Santa Barbara all provided large
admissions advantages to ELC-eligible applicants: barely
eligible applicants from the bottom half of California high
schools (ranked by SAT scores) became 10–35 percentage
points more likely to be admitted to each campus as a result
of their ELC eligibility. Over 12 percent of those applicants
switched into enrolling at one of the four “Absorbing”
UC campuses instead of enrolling at a teaching-oriented
California State University, a less-selective UC campus, or a
local community college.
Because top graduates from more-competitive high
schools had little need for ELC eligibility to gain UC
admission, almost 90 percent of those barely eligible ELC
participants were from the bottom half of California high
schools by SAT. Two-thirds of participants came from
families with below-median household incomes and about
45 percent were URM. Barely eligible participants’ average
SAT scores were at the 12th percentile of their Absorbing UC
peers, altogether suggesting a negatively selected group of
students.
Next, I turn to estimation of how ELC eligibility
impacted near-threshold ELC participants’ educational and
labor market outcomes. I show that ELC eligibility caused
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reduced-form increases in five-year degree attainment, sevenyear graduate school enrollment, and early-career annual
wages. ELC-eligible applicants became somewhat less likely
to earn degrees in STEM fields, but they became more likely
to earn any college degree while simultaneously spending
fewer years enrolled in college (as a result of reductions in
time-to-degree). To identify each of the four Absorbing UC
campuses’ treatment effects experienced by near-threshold
ELC participants, I construct four instrumental variables
by interacting the regression discontinuity design with
applicants’ distance to each campus. I find that enrolling
at any of the Absorbing UC campuses increased five-year
degree attainment by 30–34 percentage points and graduate
school enrollment by 22–47 percentage points. The estimated
effects on wages are noisier: enrolling at UC Davis increased
near-threshold participants’ annual early-career wages by
about $25,000, but the positive wage effects at the other
campuses are imprecisely estimated. Near-threshold ELC
participants from the bottom quartile of high schools (who
would have otherwise enrolled at institutions with 35 percent
lower graduation rates on average) received benefits at
least as large as those received by participants with better
counterfactual enrollments, suggesting large returns to moreselective enrollment, even for very disadvantaged applicants.
Having shown that more-selective university enrollment
substantially benefits the low-testing students on the
margin of ELC eligibility, I next turn to general equilibrium
estimation of top percent policies’ net effects on universities’
student composition and average returns. I embed a top
percent policy into a structural model of applicant and
university decision-making adapted from Kapor (2020).
The model flexibly characterizes students’ preferences over
universities and models university admissions as maximizing
the observed and latent academic caliber of their student
bodies. I estimate the model parameters by simulated
maximum likelihood, separately identifying admission and
enrollment preferences by exploiting the ELC policy, its
post-2011 cessation, and distance-to-campus instruments.
The resulting parameters align with prior research and
successfully replicate the reduced-form effects of ELC
eligibility.
I employ the model to conduct a series of counterfactual
exercises. I first simulate how ELC shifts Absorbing UC
campuses’ enrollment composition by switching ELC’s
admission advantages off (on) in 2010– 2011 (2012–2013),
allowing each university’s regular admissions threshold
to adjust in order to maintain its level of enrollment. This
allows me to identify the students who are crowded out
by ELC, a group otherwise inaccessible in my regression
discontinuity analysis. Both strategies provide highly similar
results: the 600 annual ELC participants had lower average
family incomes by $20,000 and were 15 percentage points
more likely to be URM than their crowded-out peers. I
also simulate the effect of providing ELC’s admissions
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advantages to the top 1, 2, and up to the top 9 percent of
applicants from each California high school. The simulations
show that top percent policies are indeed “access-oriented”:
the 9 percent policy increases net lower-income and URM
enrollment at Absorbing UC campuses each by about 350
students, despite the crowded-out students being negatively
selected relative to the average Absorbing UC student.
Finally, I further exploit the structural model to
investigate the broader relationship between students’
meritocratic standing and their estimated return to moreselective university enrollment. Abstracting from the ELC
policy, I employ a selection-on-unobservables strategy
(partially following Dale and Krueger [2002]) to show
that the applicants’ latent “application merit”—or the
preference index used by universities in admissions—is
strongly correlated with applicants’ future educational
and employment success, but not with their estimated
return to university selectivity; if anything, the average
return to selectivity is lower for higher-merit applicants.
These estimates complement the reduced-form evidence
that the return to university selectivity scales similarly
for ELC participants with stronger or weaker measured
academic preparation. They also complement additional
evidence showing that the wage return to near-threshold
ELC participants’ Absorbing UC campus enrollment
equals or exceeds the average return to enrolling at those
universities, estimating institutions’ average “value-added”
following Chetty et al. (2020a). These findings suggest
that the first-order net effect of top percent policies is to
reallocate educational resources to high-GPA (and perhaps
high noncognitive skill) disadvantaged applicants without
efficiency loss.
This study makes three primary contributions. First, it
provides the first estimates of the medium-run impact of
selective university admission under an access-oriented
admission policy.23 Expanding prior research that focused on
the return to selective enrollment for students on the margin
of universities’ test-based admissions thresholds (Hoekstra
2009; Anelli 2019; Sekhri 2020), I find that a broad array of
students would earn large medium-run returns from selective
university access, including many students who currently
enroll at states’ least-selective postsecondary institutions.24
This evidence suggests that broadening selective research
university access to many high school graduates with
low socioeconomic status, as through low-cost accessoriented admission policies, is an impactful and potentially
efficient economic mobility lever available to university
administrators and state policymakers. While this has been
suggested in observational and macroeconomic models
(e.g., Chetty et al. 2020a; Capelle 2019) and is assumed by
studies focused on encouraging disadvantaged students’
more-selective enrollment (e.g., Hoxby and Turner 2013),
it remains contentious in the literature on affirmative action
(Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Hotz 2016; Bleemer 2020a).
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Second, this study provides evidence on the impact of
a college admissions policy that admits students without
regard to their standardized test scores (Black, Cortes,
and Lincove 2016). Since at least 1960, when California
enshrined standardized tests in its “Master Plan for Higher
Education” to identify “applicants whose educational
purposes are properly met by the college and whose abilities
and training indicate probable success,” public universities
have used evidence of tests’ “predictive validity” for college
grades and retention to justify their rejection of lowertesting applicants (Westrick et al. 2019; Rothstein 2004).
I show that the benefits to more-selective enrollment are
at least as large (and likely larger) for high-GPA students
whose low SAT scores would typically have disqualified
them from selective universities as they are for the higherSAT students currently admitted to those universities.
Indeed, despite being negatively selected, near-threshold
ELC participants’ 75 percent average graduation rate was
roughly equal to the institutional average (77 percent). As
many public universities rethink how their meritocratic
admissions policies rank applicants (Saboe and Terrizzi
2019), these findings show that targeting high-GPA low-SAT
applicants could simultaneously broaden university access
and increase institutions’ economic value-added. Finally, this
study contributes to a nascent structural literature modeling
students’ school application and enrollment decisions
(Arcidiacono 2005; Epple, Romano, and Sieg 2006; Howell
2010; Chade, Lewis, and Smith 2014; Walters 2018; Kapor
2020), providing new detailed information about student and
university preferences. The estimated model also provides
novel estimates of the relative magnitude and compositional
effects of top percent policies with different eligibility
thresholds, facilitating straightforward comparison with other
access-oriented university admissions policies (Long 2004).

Essay 3
Major Choice Restrictions and
Student Stratification
Undergraduate major selection has long-run labor market
implications: students earn higher postgraduate wages if they
earn degrees in “high-return” professional degrees (Deming
and Noray 2020; Bleemer and Mehta 2020b) or degrees
in their preferred field of study (Kirkeboen, Leuven, and
Mogstad 2016; Daly and Le Maire 2019). URM and lowerincome university students are underrepresented in many
high-earning fields like computer science and economics,
which likely exacerbates income inequality (Monarrez
and Washington 2020). Meanwhile, many universities
impose restrictions—like minimum GPA requirements
and competitive internal applications—on which fields of
study are available to enrolled students, with restrictions
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particularly prevalent in those same high-demand fields. This
study analyzes whether and how major restrictions contribute
to the socioeconomic stratification of university students
across fields of study.
Prior studies on major selection has largely focused
on student preferences; a recent survey does not mention
major restrictions in its discussion of the “supply side”
of choosing a college major (Altonji, Arcidiacono, and
Maurel 2016).25 However, major restrictions are widely
implemented at selective public universities in the United
States. Consider five of the highest-wage college majors
at the 25 top-ranked U.S. public universities (according to
U.S. News & World Report), shown in the chapter’s Table
1. These universities enroll about 750,000 undergraduates,
or half of all students at top-100 American universities (and
7 percent of all American undergraduates).26 Half of these
schools restrict their computer science majors—typically to
students who earn high grades (minimum 2.5–3.75 GPAs)
in introductory computer science courses—while 10 have
restricted economics majors. Only two schools do not restrict
their finance majors, and only Georgia Tech does not restrict
mechanical engineering. Every university with a nursing
school restricts entry to that major.27
This study analyzes the impact of major restrictions using
a new dataset of demographic and course records for the over
900,000 students who enrolled between 1975 and 2018 at
four selective public universities: UC Berkeley, UC Davis,
UC Santa Barbara, and UC Santa Cruz. It employs differencein-difference event study designs at the departmental and
student level to estimate the effect of the 29 new major
restrictions imposed during the period. It then examines a case
study that compares students’ persistence by socioeconomic
characteristics at a restricted and an unrestricted university.
We find that major restrictions lead to a 10–20 percent
decline in the number of students declaring that major on
average. URM students and students with poorer academic
preparation are much more likely to exit restricted majors
than their peers. Major restrictions impede major choice
for students with absolute academic disadvantage, not
comparative disadvantage in the field; the students who
exit restricted majors earned similarly low first-quarter
grades across all disciplines, not just in the restricted field.
On average, restrictions cause female and URM students
intending restricted majors to instead enroll in relatively
lower- return fields of study. The case study shows that
URM and lower-income students become less likely to earn
degrees in a restricted field because of their lower average
grades in introductory courses, which is explained in part
by their lower SAT scores and more-limited prior access to
related AP and IB high school courses. This evidence implies
that major restrictions inefficiently limit student choice on
the basis of students’ preenrollment educational opportunity
and demographically stratify students across majors by
average wages.
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This study makes three main contributions. First, it
contributes to an equity-oriented literature interested in
socioeconomic stratification across (MacLeod and Urquiola
2015; Chetty et al. 2020a; Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom
2019a,b) and within (Schultz et al. 2011; Arcidiacono,
Aucejo, and Hotz 2016; Mourifie, Henry, and Meango 2020;
Brenoe and Zolitz 2020; Card and Payne 2021) universities,
providing the first known evidence that a popular university
policy magnifies stratification. Major restrictions likely have
substantive implications for impacted students’ postgraduate
outcomes: Kirkeboen, Leuven, and Mogstad (2016) show
evidence of large postgraduate wage declines among
students prohibited from earning degrees in their preferred
discipline, and Bleemer and Mehta (2020b) show that falling
just below an economics department’s GPA major restriction
substantially decreases rejected students’ early-career
wages.28
Second, this study documents an important determinant
of student major selection that has been largely omitted from
the large academic literature on major choice.29 While that
literature has largely focused on the demand-side of major
choice—particularly students’ preferences and subjective
expectations (Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Spenner 2012; Zafar
2013; Kinsler and Pavan 2015; Wiswall and Zafar 2015,
2018)—this brief describes a widely implemented supplyside policy that substantially limits many students’ access to
high-average-wage majors.30
Finally, this study contributes to a literature immediately
interested in the aggregate number of STEM degrees
awarded by American universities (Ehrenberg 2010;
National Academies 2007; Wang 2013; Sjoquist and
Winters 2015a,b; Castleman, Long, and Mabel 2018). Half
of the major restrictions imposed by the four universities
discussed below were imposed in STEM fields, and major
restrictions generally impose a previously unreported ceiling
on STEM major growth in many fields at many universities,
particularly discouraging URM and less-relatively-prepared
students from earning high-demand STEM majors.

Essay 4
Will Studying Economics Make You Rich?
A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of the
Returns to College Major
Forty-year-old U.S. workers with undergraduate degrees
in economics earned median wages of $90,000 in 2018.
By comparison, those who had majored in other social
sciences earned median wages of $65,000, and college
graduates with any major other than economics earned
$66,000. Relative to workers with lower-wage majors,
the observational premiums earned by workers with highwage majors like engineering, nursing, and economics are
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similar in size to the wage gap between college graduates
and nongraduates (Altonji, Blom, and Meghir 2012).
These gaps have motivated a large literature examining
the determinants of students’ major choices (Zafar 2013;
Stange 2015; Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Hotz 2016; Wiswall
and Zafar 2018; Patnaik et al. 2020). However, average
wage differences between majors do not necessarily reflect
the causal effect of choosing one major over another. This
study directly analyzes the treatment effects of earning an
undergraduate degree in the popular high-earning field of
economics.
Estimating the causal effects of earning specific college
majors is challenged by students’ nonrandom assortment
across majors: most students self-select their college major,
and many universities and departments use admissions and
grade requirements to restrict entry into certain majors.
As a result, observational wage differences across majors
may reflect selection bias. We overcome this challenge
by using a regression discontinuity design that exploits a
fuzzy discontinuity in economics major access at a large
moderately selective public university (Angrist and Lavy
1999).31 We implement this design to estimate the effect of
studying economics on students’ early-career earnings and
industries, as well as how the major’s effect on earnings
is mediated by changes in students’ other educational
outcomes, career preferences, and early-career industries.
We then characterize and estimate the biases that arise when
using observational average wage differences between
economics and other majors as a proxy for the effect of
majoring in economics.
The specific case we analyze is the department of
economics at UC Santa Cruz. UCSC Economics imposed a
GPA restriction policy in 2008: students with a grade point
average below 2.8 in Economics 1 and 2 were generally
prevented from declaring an economics major. Students
who just met the GPA threshold were 36 percentage points
more likely to declare the economics major than those who
just failed to meet it. Most of these students would have
otherwise earned degrees in other social sciences. Students
just above the threshold who majored in economics were
surprisingly representative of all UCSC economics majors
on observables; for example, their average SAT scores was at
the 41st percentile of economics majors.
Comparing the major choices and average wages of
above- and below-threshold students shows that majoring
in economics caused a $22,000 (46 percent) increase in
the annual early-career wages of barely above-threshold
students. It did so without otherwise impacting their
educational investment—as measured by course-adjusted
average grades and weekly hours spent studying—or
outcomes like degree attainment and graduate school
enrollment. The effect is nearly identical for male and female
students, may be larger for underrepresented minority
students, and appears to grow as workers age (between ages
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23 and 28). About half of the wage effect can be explained by
the effect of majoring in economics on students’ industry of
employment: relative to students who did not qualify for the
major, economics majors became more interested in business
and finance careers and were more likely to find employment
in higher-wage economics-related industries like finance,
insurance, and real estate and accounting. A decomposition
of this wage effect shows that the return to majoring in
economics would likely have been above-average for the
near-threshold students rejected from the economics major,
once again suggesting the potential for efficiency and
economic mobility gains in implementing a less “merit”oriented allocation policy.
This is one of the first studies to employ a quasiexperimental research design to identify labor market returns
to college major choice in the United States.32 A small
number of previous studies have analyzed major-specific
returns in other countries by exploiting centralized fieldspecific enrollment assignment rules (Kirkeboen, Leuven,
and Mogstad 2016; Hastings, Nielsen, and Zimmerman
2018; Daly and Le Maire 2019). However, the external
validity of those estimates in the United States may be
limited: American universities offer a broader core liberal
arts curriculum, permit students to choose their majors years
after their initial enrollment, and provide students with more
discretion over their courses, all of which could narrow fieldspecific returns. A large literature has employed selectionon-observables methods and structural estimation to identify
major-specific returns (James et al. 1989; Rumberger and
Thomas 1993; Black, Sanders, and Taylor 2003; Arcidiacono
2004; Hamermesh and Donald 2008), generally arguing that
selection bias explains a substantial portion of U.S. wage
variation across majors.
This study’s reduced-form regression discontinuity design
provides unusually transparent evidence of postsecondary
education’s heterogeneous and persistent role in shaping
students’ labor market outcomes. Our estimated early-career
wage return to economics rivals the baseline return to a
college degree, implying that major choice is a first-order
heterogeneity component in the return to higher education.
A related literature has used quasi-experimental research
designs to highlight university selectivity as another
important dimension of heterogeneous university treatment
effects (Hoekstra 2009; Zimmerman 2014; Cohodes and
Goodman 2014; Bleemer 2018, 2020a). However, even
students who are quasi-randomly switched to enrolling at
universities with 25 percentage points higher graduation
rates—a large increase in selectivity—receive an early-career
wage return 30 percent lower than the return to majoring in
economics at UCSC (Bleemer 2018). These findings imply
that widespread but understudied university policies that
shape student major choice—like GPA restrictions, variable
tuition, and grade inflation—have important long-run
efficiency and social mobility ramifications.
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Notes
1. See Hoekstra (2009); Zimmerman (2014); Anelli (2019);
Kozakowski (2019); Sekhri (2020); Smith, Goodman, and
Hurwitz (2020). Few quasi-experimental studies examine
selective universities’ value to applicants with poorer measured
academic qualifications, but Cohodes and Goodman (2014) and
Bleemer (2018) provide evidence of their return to selectivity
in other contexts.
2. URM includes African American (Black), Chicano and Latino
(Hispanic), and Native American students.
3. Non-URM applicants may not represent a traditional
unimpacted comparison group, since some likely “crowded
into” more-selective universities after Prop 209. I return to
the question of non-URM applicant outcomes in the essay, but
the fact that non-URM applicants outnumber URM applicants
by more than four-to-one in the applicant pool dilutes any
“crowd-in” effects, implying that at least 80 percent of the
observed differences are likely driven by changes in URM
applicant outcomes.
4. AI and ethnicity explained 40–70 percent of admissions
variation at most UC campuses in the mid-1990s. Cortes (2010)
uses a similar design to compare student outcomes between
Texas’s affirmative action and Top Ten policies.
5. I estimate institutional value-added by regressing degree
attainment and wages on UC applicants’ first enrollment
institution, conditioning on observables following either
Mountjoy and Hickman (2020) or Chetty et al. (2020a).
6. These changes cannot be explained by California labor market
entry or exit: 69 percent of UC applicants had positive annual
CA wages between ages 24 and 34, and URM applicants’
employment remained unchanged overall and in each AI
quartile.
7. This finding is in line with Chetty et al.’s (2020b) argument that
educational differences cannot explain the Black-white wage
gap in the United States, although that study does not discuss
the role of university selectivity.
8. Other potential threats—including nonreported applicant
ethnicity, imperfect National Student Clearinghouse degree
reporting, and some campuses’ preemptive implementation of
Prop 209—are discussed in the essay.
9. Card and Krueger (2005) reach a different conclusion when
they proxy university applications with SAT “score sends”
from the College Board. My analysis uses actual university
applications.
10. In particular, I perform a Monte Carlo exercise randomly
selecting sets of detailed covariates like family income,
parental occupation and education, and additional measures of
academic preparation for model inclusion. While the baseline
estimates are insensitive to additional covariates, bias on
orthogonal unobserved characteristics could remain.
11. See Loury and Garman (1993); Holzer and Neumark (2000);
Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Hotz (2016).
12. I show that relative enrollment at high- and low-value-add
California universities was unchanged by Prop 209.
13. Black, Denning, and Rothstein (2020) also provide evidence
against large returns to more-selective university enrollment
for the students who were “crowded out” of selective Texas
universities by Texas Top Ten.
14. Selection bias in the estimated value-added statistics will tend
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15.
16.
17.

18.

19.

20.

21.
22.

23.

24.

25.

to exaggerate differences across institutions, implying that Prop
209’s estimated effect on institutional value-added is likely
biased upward.
See Backes (2012); Hinrichs (2012, 2014); Blume and Long
(2014); Hill (2017); Long and Bateman (2020).
See Alon and Tienda (2005); Howell (2010); Arcidiacono,
Aucejo, and Hotz (2016); Kapor (2020).
See Antonovics and Backes (2013, 2014); Arcidiacono et al.
(2014); Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Hotz (2016). Bagde, Epple,
and Taylor (2016) and Bertrand, Hanna, and Mullainathan
(2010) show that Indian universities’ caste-based affirmative
action improves targeted students’ grades and wage outcomes,
respectively.
See, e.g., Dale and Krueger (2002) and Arcidiacono
(2004). Bowen and Bok (1998) and Arcidiacono (2005) use
selection-on- observables and a structural model, respectively,
to identify the effect of affirmative action on URM students’
wages. Zimmerman (2019) shows that the largest returns to
elite Chilean university enrollment accrue only to high-income
students.
Two recent studies of affirmative action “mismatch” also
analyze UC in the 1990s (Arcidiacono et al. 2014; Arcidiacono,
Aucejo, and Hotz 2016). Bleemer (2020b) discusses the
limitations of that previous research in the specific context of
Prop 209 and reconciles his analysis with my baseline findings.
Dillon and Smith (2020) and Barrow, Sartain, and de la Torre
(2020) find evidence of test- and income-based “mismatch” at
U.S. undergraduate institutions and elite Chicago public high
schools, respectively.
Until surging demand for postsecondary education made
open access impossible in the late 1950s, public universities
provided low-cost education to any student who satisfactorily
completed high school (Douglass 2007; Goldin and Katz 2008).
Top percent policies have been implemented in Texas, Florida,
and Georgia, and have been considered in several other states.
As I discuss below, ELC was indeed “expanded” in 2012 to the
top 9 percent of applicants from each high school, but I show
that every selective UC campus ceased providing admissions
advantages to ELC-eligible students, de facto ending the
policy’s effects on the composition of UC enrollment.
Bertrand, Hanna, and Mullainathan (2010) estimate a positive
wage return to caste-based affirmative action programs at
engineering colleges in India. Subsequent to this study,
Bleemer (2020a) and Black, Denning, and Rothstein (2020)
find similar reduced-form returns to a race-based affirmative
action policy in California and a top percent policy in Texas,
but neither paper is amenable to an instrumental variable
strategy that identifies effects for policy compliers.
Zimmerman (2014) and Smith, Goodman, and Hurwitz (2020)
show positive returns to less- or nonselective university
enrollment for students at those institutions’ admissions
thresholds. Dale and Krueger (2002, 2014) show evidence of
positive returns for disadvantaged students enrolling at highly
selective institutions instead of other selective institutions,
and Cohodes and Goodman (2014) show that more-selective
enrollment improves students’ degree attainment.
Stange (2015), Andrews and Stange (2019), and Denning and
Turley (2017) discuss major-specific price discrimination
and payments, which are important—though presently lesscommon—supply-side contributors to major choice.

15

26. Wage statistics as reported by Altonji, Blom, and Meghir (2012).
27. Grade restrictions of C+ (2.3) or below are excluded, as they
are generally put in place to prevent students who cannot pass
upper-division courses from beginning technical majors, not to
manage demand among capable students.
28. Griffith (2010) shows that students with lower measured
preparedness are less likely to earn STEM majors, while
Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Hotz (2016) and Bleemer (2020a)
come to different conclusions about whether enrollment at
more-selective universities under affirmative action decreases
URM students’ STEM degree attainment.
29. See Altonji, Blom, and Meghir (2012) and Altonji, Arcidiacono,
and Maurel (2016) for surveys.
30. This study also documents a source of selection bias in the
estimation of major-specific returns (Arcidiacono 2004).
31. This design was suggested by both Altonji, Blom, and Meghir
(2012) and Altonji, Arcidiacono, and Maurel (2016).
32. The only known quasi-experimental study to previously
identify heterogeneous returns by college major in the United
States is Andrews, Imberman, and Lovenheim (2017), who
analyze the return to majoring in business by exploiting a GPA
threshold policy at several University of Texas campuses. Their
suggestive finding of a large wage return to business majors
closely parallels our own estimates with regard to economics.
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